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CORRESPONDENCE, from C. Tobler
Putting Mangold in perspective: in response to Editorial comments,
Horizontal direct effect – A law of diminishing coherence?1
1. Introductory remarks
In its hotly debated decision in the Mangold case, handed down by the 
Court’s Grand Chamber on 22 November 2005,2 the Court of Justice found 
that national law such as that at issue – according to which the conclusion 
of a fixed-term employment contract did not require objective justification 
if the worker had reached the age of 52 (formerly 58) by the time the fixed-
term employment relationship began – amounted to direct discrimination on 
grounds of age as prohibited by the Employment Framework Directive,3 and 
that this finding could not be called into question by the fact that the period 
for the implementation of the Directive had not yet expired. Since then, dif-
ferent views have been offered on the meaning and the consequences of the 
Mangold decision, in particular in Germany (Mangold was a German case).4 
Most commentators are not sure how to interpret the decision, but many think 
1. 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1.
2. Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, [2005] ECR I-9981.
3. Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16.
4. See e.g. Gas, “Gastkommentar: Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit von Richtlinien zu 
Lasten Privater im Urteil „Mangold“”, (2005)  EuZW, 737; Herrmann, “Die negative unmit-
telbare Wirkung von Richtlinien in horizontalen Rechtsverhältnissen. Erwiderung auf T. Gas, 
Gastkommentar Heft 24/2005, S. 737”, (2006) EuZW, 69–70; Körner, “Europäisches Verbot der 
Altersdiskriminierung in Beschäftigung und Beruf ”, (2005) Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 
(NZA), 1395–1398; Thüsing, “Europarechtlicher Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz als Bindung des 
Arbeitgebers?”, (2005) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht – ZIP, 2149–2151; Arnuß, “Das Verbot 
der Altersdiskriminierung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht”, (2006) BB, 325–327; Bauer and 
Arnold, “Auf „Junk“ folgt „Mangold“ – Europarecht verdrängt deutsches Arbeitsrecht”, (2006) 
NJW, 6–12; Koenigs, “Unbegrenzte Prüfungsbefugnis des EuGH?”, (2006) Der Betrieb, 49–50; 
Mayr, “Das Verbot der Altersdiskriminierung als allgemeiner Grundsatz des Gemeinschafts-
rechts”, (2006) European Law Reporter, 2–6; Reich, “Gemeinschaftswidrigkeit der sachgrund-
losen Befristungsmöglichkeit bei Arbeitnehmern ab 52 Jahren”, (2006) EuZW, 17–22; Schmidt, 
“The Mangold Case before the European Court of Justice”, (2006) German Law Journal, vol. 
7, www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=728; Strybny, “Verstoss des § 14 Abs. 3 TzBfG 
gegen das gemeinschaftsrechtliche Diskriminierungsverbot”, (2005) BB, 2753–2754. Even be-
fore the judgment, there were comments on the A.G.’s Opinion; see Jobst-Hubertus, “Ein Stück 
aus dem Tollhaus: Altersbefristung und der EuGH”, (2005) NZA, 800–803; Waas, “Europarecht-
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that through Mangold the Court recognized, albeit only implicitly, the hori-
zontal direct effect of provisions of a directive in a situation where the imple-
mentation period for the directive at issue was still running. This was also 
the view of the editors of the Common Market Law Review, who called the 
Mangold decision “yet another twist in the Court’s convoluted case law about 
the direct effect of Directives”.5
I would submit that it is possible not only to read the decision in a some-
what different manner, as suggested by Jans6 in response to the Common 
Market Law Review’s editorial, but in fact in an entirely different manner. I 
base this view on two special features of the Community legislation involved 
that will not easily be present in other cases. First, when holding that the find-
ing of direct age discrimination could not be called into question by the fact 
that the period for the implementation of the Employment Framework Direc-
tive had not yet expired, the Court pointed to Article 18(2) of the Employment 
Framework Directive, which concerns the implementation period. Second the 
Court made much of the nature of the Directive as a “Framework” Directive.
2. The period for the implementation of the Employment Framework
 Directive
According to Article 18(1), the Employment Framework Directive had to be 
implemented by 2 December 2003 at the latest. However, “in order to take 
account of particular conditions and if necessary”, the Member States could 
have an additional three years in relation to age and disability discrimina-
tion. This is why the implementation period in relation to age discrimination 
was still running in Germany at the time when the facts of the Mangold case 
occurred. It may be interesting to note that the Commission’s proposals for 
liche Schranken für die Befristung von Arbeitsverträgen mit älteren Arbeitnehmern”, (2005) 
EuZW, 583–587.
5. Editorial comments, cited supra note 1. Editorial comments in English were also pub-
lished elsewhere, e.g. “Out with the old …”, (2006) EL Rev., 1–2. For further comments in 
English see e.g. Gijzen, Selected Issues in Equal Treatment Law: A multil-layered comparison of 
European, English and Dutch law, Ph. D. thesis Maastricht University (2006), pp. 441 et seq.; 
Waddington, “Recent developments and the non-discrimination Directives: Mangold and more”, 
(2006) MJ, 365–373, at 369.
6. Jans, “De doorwerking in de nationale rechtsorde van het verbod van leeftijdsdiscriminatie 
als algemeen beginsel van gemeenschapsrecht”, Chapt. 8 in Herweijer, Vonk and Zondag (Eds), 
Sociale zekerheid voor het oog van de meester. Opstellen voor prof. mr. F.M. Noordam (De-
venter, Kluwer, 2006), pp. 115–129; also published as “The effect in national legal systems of 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age as a general principle of Community Law”, 
(2007) LIEI, 53–66. On Jans’ argument, see further note 11 infra.
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the Directive (both the original7 and the amended proposal)8 did not provide 
for such a possibility of extension, which was inserted into the draft text by 
the Council of Ministers. When doing so, the Council did not simply state 
the possibility of extension but explicitly added the obligation of the Mem-
ber States who avail themselves of this possibility to “report annually to the 
Commission on the steps it is taking to tackle age and disability discrimina-
tion and on the progress it is making towards implementation”. It should be 
noted that this is a concrete and specific obligation that goes much further 
than a mere standstill obligation, in that the Member States are obliged to 
take positive steps to tackle age and disability discrimination.
It is against this background that the Court in Mangold analysed the chang-
es in the German law at issue (i.e. the lowering of the age limit in relation to 
fixed-term employment for which there was no need for explanation from 58 
years to 52 years) in the light of the Directive. In other words: in order to find 
out whether Germany had respected its obligation under Article 18(2), the 
Court had to examine whether the amendment to the German law that was at 
issue in Mangold amounted to age discrimination within the meaning of the 
Directive. In this context, the Court – logically – had to resort to the Direc-
tive’s substantive provisions, including in particular Article 6(1), concerning 
justification of differences of treatment on grounds of age. The Court found 
that Germany had indeed acted contrary to its obligations under Article 18(2) 
of the Employment Framework Directive. Rather than taking positive steps in 
order to tackle age discrimination, the German legislation in fact introduced 
new discrimination.
On this first level, therefore, Mangold simply concerns the failure of Ger-
many to fulfil its specific and positive “pre-implementation duties” under 
Article 18(2) of the Directive. It seems clear to me that this is not a case 
of direct effect in a traditional sense, since such “traditional” cases concern 
provisions of directives that have to be implemented by the Member States. 
Article 18(2) is, precisely and only, meant to have effect during the extended 
implementation period. In my opinion, there is no reason why in such a case 
an individual should not be allowed to rely on the primacy of EC law in the 
face of conflicting national law. Further and for the same reason, Mangold 
7. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working condi-
tions, COM(2000)334 fin., O.J. 2000, C 337 E/204.
8. Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions, COM(2001)321 fin., O.J. 2001, C 270 E/9.
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should also not be seen as similar to CIA Securitel9 and Unilever Italia,10 as 
suggested by Jans.11 The situation addressed in these cases relates to the ef-
fect of provisions of the directive that need to implemented. Again, that is not 
at issue in Mangold. Finally, Mangold should also not be seen as a case elab-
orating the Inter-Environnement Wallonie principle.12 Indeed, the positive 
obligation under Article 18(2) of the Directive to take steps to tackle age and 
disability discrimination is both more specific and more far-reaching than the 
negative obligation under the Inter-Environnement Wallonie case law, which 
is to refrain from all actions that are liable seriously to compromise the aims 
of the Directive.
3. The nature of the Employment Framework Directive as a
 “Framework” Directive
As a second element in its reasoning, the Court of Justice points to the fact 
that the Directive at issue is a “Framework” Directive. According to the 
Court, this means that the Directive only regulates issues such as remedies, 
the burden of proof, protection against victimization, social dialogue, affir-
mative action and other specific measures, but not the prohibitions of dis-
crimination on grounds of age as such. This prohibition, the Court explains, 
flows from international instruments and the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States (as mentioned in the Directive’s preamble) and 
thus constitutes a general principle of EC law. Accordingly, reliance on the 
prohibition is not conditional on the expiry of the Directive’s implementation 
period.13
With this approach, the Court chose to disregard the Commission’s inten-
tion when it proposed the text of the Employment Framework Directive. The 
Commission14 intended the term “Framework Directive” to be understood 
9. Case C-194/4, CIA Security v. Signalson and Securitel, [1996] ECR I-2201.
10. Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia v. Central Food, [2000] ECR I-7535.
11. According to Jans, Mangold does not concern the issue of direct effect in the proper 
sense of the concept, but rather the “invocabilité d’exclusion”, that is, the right of an individual 
to rely on EC law in order to contest the legality of national public law that is in conflict with the 
principle and that governs a relationship under private law, Jans op. cit. supra note 6, at 124.
12. Case C-129/96, Inter-Environment Wallonie v. Région Wallone, [1997] ECR I-7411.
13. This approach is criticized by A.G. Mazák in Case C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa 
v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, pending. He described the Court’s approach in Mangold as “ascribing 
direct effect to the corresponding general principle of law” and went on to say that “In adopting 
that approach the Court set foot on a very slippery slope not only with regard to the question 
whether such a general principle of law on the non-discrimination on grounds of age exists, but 
also with regard to the way it applied that principle”, see paras. 132–133 of the Opinion.
14. See the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum on the first proposal for the amending 
Directive, supra note 7, point 3.2.
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within the meaning of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality.15 Ac-
cording to the Protocol, “[t]he form of Community action shall be as simple 
as possible, consistent with satisfactory achievement of the objective of the 
measure and the need for effective enforcement. Other things being equal, 
directives should be preferred to regulations and framework directives to de-
tailed measures”. In this context the term “Framework Directive” refers to 
the qualitative degree of regulation on the Community level, rather than to 
the quantitative degree of regulation, as held by the Court. In my opinion, it 
would have been more convincing if the Court had based its reasoning on the 
special nature of age discrimination, along the lines of an argument made by 
Advocate General Tizzano.16 This argument relates to the fact that, differently 
from other types of discrimination, the meaning of the general principle of 
equal treatment on grounds of age and the meaning of the prohibition of age 
discrimination in the Directive are identical, at least if the former is under-
stood literally (i.e. as referring to same treatment).17 Understood in this way, 
the general principle of equal treatment (i.e. the principle as unrelated to a 
discrimination ground) requires the same treatment of comparable situations, 
unless there is objective justification for different treatment. This also applies 
in the context of general principles of equal treatment that focus on a specific 
discrimination ground,18 such as in the context of age. As for the Employment 
Framework Directive, it uses the same approach for age discrimination (but 
15. Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, attached 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam, O.J. 1997, C 340, point 6.
16. Mangold, supra note 2, para 84 in the AG’s Opinion – though the A.G. makes his argu-
ment in the context of the general principle of equality, rather than of equal treatment on grounds 
of age. In my opinion, the latter is more convincing since the former raises difficult questions 
of comparability.
17. The general equality principle is defined as requiring that “comparable situations must 
not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless 
such treatment is objectively justified” (Joined Cases 117/76 & 16/77, Albert Ruckdeschel and 
Hansa-Lagerhaus Ströh v. Hautzollamt Maburg-St. Annen, [1977] ECR 1753, para. 7). How-
ever, the Court does not always distinguish between the general principle of equality and the 
general principle of equal treatment, and its definitions are not always consistent. E.g.  the Court 
has described the general principle of equality and non-discrimination as requiring that “com-
parable situations should not be treated differently unless such difference in treatment is objec-
tively justified”, without referring to the second part of the above formula (e.g. Case C-520/03, 
José Vicente Olaso Valero v. Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa), [2004] ECR I-12065, para 
34). On other occasions, the Court defined the general principle of equal treatment as requiring 
that “comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be 
treated in the same manner unless such treatment is objectively justified” (e.g. Joined Cases C-
182 & 217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v. Commission, [2006] ECR I-5479, para 170).
18. E.g. the Court long ago acknowledged the existence of a general principle prohibiting 
sex discrimination, which at that time simply meant a prohibition of unequal treatment; Case 
149/77, Defrenne v. SABENA, [1978] ECR 1365 (Defrenne III).
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only age discrimination!) in that any age discrimination, and thus even direct 
age discrimination, can be justified based on objective justifications (Art. 
6(1) of the Directive).19 In other words, when it comes to the basic prohibi-
tion of discrimination on grounds of age (Art. 6(1) Employment Framework 
Directive), the Directive does not add anything to the general principle but 
in that regard has only a declarative function. In such a situation, there is no 
reason why an individual should not be able to rely on the general principle 
instead. In contrast, in the other contexts mentioned earlier (e.g. positive ac-
tion, burden of proof) the directive is instrumental.
4. The practical consequences of Mangold: Much ado about nothing?
However, whatever the merit of the above arguments regarding the special 
nature of age discrimination, the fact remains that the Court did not choose 
to base its reasoning on the Commission’s intent regarding the proposition 
of a “Framework Directive”. Even so, it would seem that the finding in Man-
gold is of very limited practical consequence because the Court’s finding 
appears to be based on a combination of the two factors mentioned above. If 
this is correct, then it means in my opinion that the finding can be relevant 
only when (i) there is a positive duty of the Member States under a provision 
like Article 18(2) Employment Framework Directive, AND (ii) the legislative 
EC measure at issue in the context of a particular type of discrimination is a 
Framework Directive within the meaning given to this term by the Court in 
Mangold.
In the present state of EC law and to my knowledge, the second point con-
cerns only the Employment Framework Directive, and thereby discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation, disability, age and religion or belief. The 
first point concerns age discrimination and disability discrimination only, 
since only in relation to these does the Directive provide for the possibility of 
19. In the field of social law, only few Directives reflect this approach, namely the Part-
Time Work Directive (Directive 97/81/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time 
work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, O.J. 1998, L 14/9), the Fixed-Term Work 
Directive (Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work con-
cluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, O.J. 1999, L 175/43) and, in the field of sex equality law, 
the Goods and Services Directive (Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, O.J. 2004, 
L 373/37). In the Employment Framework Directive, direct discrimination on one of the other 
grounds mentioned can be justified only based on Art. 2(5) (public security, public order, health, 
rights and freedoms of others) and based on Art. 4 (occupational requirements). In my opinion, 
Art. 7 on positive action is not construed as a derogation. This is indicated by the reference in 
Art. 7 to “full equality in practice” and by the lack of the words “notwithstanding Article 2(2)”, 
that can be found in Arts. 4 and 6.
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an extended implementation period. In other words, the combination of the 
two points means that that the Court’s findings in Mangold can be relevant 
only in the context of age and disability discrimination. Further, it should be 
remembered that the second point can arise only in relation to Member States 
that have actually made use of the possibility to extend the implementation 
period. That, again, narrows down the range of potential situations in which 
Mangold might apply. Finally, given that the extended implementation pe-
riod has meanwhile expired, no new cases can arise that would be covered 
by Mangold. In my opinion, all of this shows that the Mangold judgment is 
far from being capable of having the far-reaching consequences that some 
commentators ascribe to it. Indeed, the impression might be that of much 
ado about nothing. However, one never knows when the Court might find the 
reasoning used in Mangold, especially that on the general principle, useful in 
other contexts. 
Some clarification on the implications of the Mangold decision may be 
expected from a case now pending at the Court of Justice, namely Bartsch,20 
where the national court’s first question is as follows: “Does the primary 
legislation of the European Communities contain a prohibition of discrimi-
nation on grounds of age the protection by which must be guaranteed by the 
Member States even if the possibly discriminatory treatment is not connected 
to Community law?”
Christa Tobler*
20. Case C-427/06, Birgit Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge 
GmbH, pending.
* Leiden (The Netherlands) and Basel (Switzerland)
